Do experts form rational beliefs when making split-second, sophisticated judgments? A long literature suggests not: individuals often form prior beliefs from biased sampling and update those beliefs by improperly weighting new information. This paper studies belief formation by professional umpires in Major League Baseball. We show that the decisions of umpires reflect an accurate, probabilistic, and state-specific understanding of their rational expectations-as well as an ability to integrate those prior beliefs in a manner that approximates Bayes rule. Given that umpires have barely a second to form beliefs and make a decision, we conclude that the instincts of professional umpires mimic a sophisticated level of rationality remarkably well.
Introduction
Experts routinely make split-second judgments. Soldiers evaluate whether passersby are combatants. Police evaluate whether suspects pose threats. Paramedics evaluate whether injuries need treatment at the scene. Defense analysts evaluate whether radar blips indicate an attack. And traders evaluate a security's expected returns after unexpected news. Do they form rational beliefs? That is, do they begin with rational expectations-i.e., the share of combatants in the population, the rate at which suspects threaten officers, how often injuries require immediate attention, how frequently radar noise implies an attack, or the prior distribution of expected returns? And if so, do they appropriately weigh those prior beliefs against new information-e.g., the pedestrian pushing buttons on a cell phone, the suspect reaching into a pocket, the vital signs of the injured, the pattern on the radar, or the content of the news?
A long literature in behavioral economics and psychology suggests not. Individuals often form prior beliefs from biased sampling and update those beliefs by improperly weighting new information.
1 Controlled experiments-in which beliefs are elicited through surveys, and the distribution of the signal is specified by the experimenter-largely find that lay subjects violate Bayes rule (Grether, 1980; El-Gamal and Grether, 1995; Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus and Rosenblat, 2011) , although different elicitation methods can produce different conclusions (e.g., Andreoni and Mylovanov, 2012) . In natural contexts, however, beliefs and signals are typically unobservable. As a result, tests of rational belief formation by experts have relied on indirect evidence. An interesting question in finance, for example, is whether investors overreact to news. The empirical difficulty is that whereas prices are 1 A vast body of research has documented biases in belief formation (for a review, see Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin, 2004) . On the one hand, individuals often underweight new information, particularly when overconfident (e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001) or when the information contradicts their prior beliefs (Nickerson, 1998) . On the other hand, individuals often overweight new observations when they are salient (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972 )-even when they are obviously uninformative, as when people anchor on the spin of a wheel (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) , the roll of a die (Mussweiler, 2001) , or the last two digits of a social security number (Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2003) . People also see patterns in randomness (Chen, Moskowitz and Shue, 2016) , make strong inferences from few observations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971) , neglect selection bias in sample observations (Koehler and Mercer, 2009) , and are only attentive to salient information (e.g. Lacetera, Pope and Sydnor, 2012) . Whether people favor their prior beliefs or new information can depend on what they want to believe. Those with incentives to change their beliefs seek out contravening information, whereas those with incentives to reaffirm their beliefs resist such information, even when it is free (Ambuehl, 2016) . Individuals who manage to form beliefs absent any bias or corruption may nonetheless succumb to the difficulty of explicitly calculating a posterior belief via Bayes rule, especially if they are among the majority of educated subjects who confuse probabilities and proportions (Lipkus et al., 2001) . As a result, models of non-Bayesian updating have proliferated (e.g. Akerlof and Dickens, 1982; Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Rabin and Schrag, 1999; Rabin, 2002; Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005) . observable, true valuations are not. Consequently, tests of rational belief formation among investors require the analyst to specify an equilibrium model of asset pricing, and such tests may be invalid if the model is misspecified (cf. De Bondt and Thaler, 1985) .
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This paper exploits an unusual natural setting, in which both rational expectations and signals are observable, to directly evaluate the extent to which experienced agents form rational beliefs. We study professional umpires in Major League Baseball. In baseball, when the pitcher makes a pitch and the batter chooses not to swing, the umpire immediately makes a call-either a ball or a strike. By rule, the umpire is supposed to call a strike when the pitch intersects a bounded region defined by the official strike zone, and a ball otherwise. The umpire's difficulty is that he imperfectly observes the location of the pitch: pitches travel fast, and the boundaries of the official strike zone are invisible. An umpire with imperfect vision can improve the accuracy of his calls by incorporating rational expectations about where the pitch will be thrown. Using data from stereoscopic cameras that record the precise location of each pitch, we measure rational expectations as the empirical distribution of pitch locations when the batter does not swing. These expectations represent the umpire's best guess of where the pitch was thrown, absent observing the pitch itself. Our data also allow us to specify the signal, under the innocuous assumption that the umpire's observation is drawn from a distribution centered at the true location of the pitch.
Baseball enthusiasts and academic researchers have noted an intriguing pattern in umpire decisions. Whereas MLB instructs umpires to call balls and strikes based solely on the location of the pitch, umpires make different calls in different counts, or game states, for pitches at the same location (Moskowitz and Wertheim, 2011; Green and Daniels, 2014; Mills, 2014) . When the pitch is obviously inside the strike zone or obviously outside the strike zone, the umpire almost always makes the correct call regardless of the count. But for pitches near the boundary of the official strike zone, the probability of a strike call can vary between counts by more than 60 percentage points.
We show that a simple Bayesian model predicts these patterns. In our model, the umpire's observation of the pitch provides a noisy signal of its location, which he integrates with his rational expectations to form posterior beliefs. If according to those posterior beliefs, the location of the pitch is more likely than not to be inside the strike zone, the umpire calls a strike; otherwise, he calls a ball. The rational-expectations prior shifts the umpire's posterior beliefs towards locations that are a priori more expected. For observed locations that are obviously inside the strike zone or obviously outside the strike zone, these shifts do not change the umpire's call. But for observed locations just inside the strike zone, expectations that place greater weight just outside the strike zone change the umpire's call from strike to ball. Likewise, for observed locations just outside the strike zone, expectations that place greater weight just inside the strike zone change the umpire's call from ball to strike.
Count-based variation in rational expectations generates count-based variation in calls. When the count favors the batter, the pitcher needs to throw a strike, and the batter can afford not to swing. As a result, the umpire expects to make calls on pitches inside the official strike zone. If he is unsure whether the pitch is a ball or a strike, he calls what he expects: a strike. By contrast, when the count favors the pitcher, the pitcher can afford to throw a ball, and the batter cannot risk letting a strike go by. As a result, the umpire expects to make calls on pitches outside the official strike zone. If he is unsure whether the pitch is a ball or a strike, he calls what he expects: a ball.
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These predictions match the data almost exactly. The enforced strike zone, or the region in which umpires empirically call strikes in expectation, shrinks and expands across counts. When the count most favors the batter, the enforced strike zone is 58% larger than when the count most favors the pitcher, with the change concentrated near the top of the official strike zone. We use the model to predict the region in which umpires call strikes in expectation, and we find that in every count, this predicted strike zone is nearly coincident with the enforced strike zone. Not only does the model reproduce the expansion and contraction of enforced strike zone-it also reproduces the spatial pattern in which calls on pitches near the top of the official strike zone are most affected by the count. Our model is accurate and parsimonious. Changes in the predicted strike zone with the count follow from the datai.e., from differences in rational expectations across counts. Just 2 parameters govern the variance of the signal, which modulates the responsiveness of the posterior to the rationalexpectations prior.
Conventional wisdom among baseball enthusiasts, as well as previous academic research, has attributed count-based differences in called-strike rates to a preference for avoiding gamechanging calls-i.e., by favoring the pitcher when the count favors the batter, and vice versa (Moskowitz and Wertheim, 2011; Mills, 2014; Green and Daniels, 2015) . We show that this taste-based account both fails to predict other key patterns in the data and predicts patterns that do not materialize. An aversion to game-changing, or pivotal, calls predicts that for decisions in which neither option is pivotal, called-strike rates will not vary. In fact, calledstrike rates do vary between counts in which both a ball and a strike would be non-pivotal, and they do so in a manner that is predicted by our Bayesian model. The taste-based account also predicts that non-count factors which amplify asymmetries in game impact (e.g., score differential between teams) will amplify differences in called-strike rates. However, we show that called-strike rates do not meaningfully depend on these factors. Instead, we show how a rational process generates behaviors that appear anomalous (e.g. Backus, Blake and Tadelis, 2015; Miller and Sanjurjo, 2016) .
Our results provide striking evidence of rational updating: a simple Bayesian model reproduces otherwise puzzling empirical patterns. Though the model is straightforward, the behavior it predicts requires considerable sophistication. Umpires' rational expectations differ by pitch location and by count, and the umpire has barely a second to appropriately weigh these expectations against his noisy perception of the location of the pitch. While dominant accounts predict that lay judgments will violate rationality under such conditions (for a review, see Kahneman, 2011) , whether the heuristics of experienced agents fail in similar ways is less clear. Some have speculated that with repetition and feedback, heuristics can be refined to approximate complex calculations (Kahneman and Klein, 2009) . However, evidence is limited and often finds that experts exhibit the same instinctive biases as inexperienced subjects and to similar degrees (e.g. Haigh and List, 2005; Larson, List and Metcalfe, 2016) . We find evidence of sophisticated, heuristic judgment by experts: the decisions of umpires reflect an accurate, probabilistic, and count-specific understanding of the distribution of called pitches-as well as an ability to integrate those prior beliefs in a manner that approximates Bayes rule.
These skills likely result from some combination of instruction, selection, and feedback. Professional umpires are trained to make accurate calls, and they are promoted and rewarded based on performance. They also receive unparalleled feedback-MLB uses the same pitch location data that we analyze to depict each umpire's mistakes after every game-which we suspect further hones instincts that mimic a complex Bayesian logic. The tradition of bounded rationality presumes that individuals often lack the cognitive resources to behave optimally (e.g. Simon, 1982) . Our results suggest that highly rational behavior can be learned intuitively, and hence, that feedback and repetition, rather than intelligence, can underpin rationality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context and the data. Section 3 shows how the enforced strike zone changes with the count. Section 4 details our Bayesian model, illustrates its dynamics with examples, and evaluates its predictions under different types of prior beliefs. In Section 5, we compare the model's predictions under a sophisticated, rational-expectations prior to the empirical patterns from Section 3. Section 6 concludes.
Context and Data
Most plays in baseball begin with the pitcher throwing a pitch towards home plate, an irregular pentagon in the ground. As shown in Figure 1 , the batter stands beside home plate, and the umpire looks over the catcher from behind home plate. If the batter chooses not to swing, the home plate umpire then makes a call : either a ball or a strike. MLB defines the official strike zone as "that area over home plate the upper limit of which is a horizontal line at the midpoint between the top of the [batter's] shoulders and the top of the uniform pants, and the lower level is a line at the hollow beneath the kneecap."
4 Pitches that intersect the official strike zone should be called strikes; pitches that do not intersect the official strike zone should be called balls.
Figure 1:
The batter stands beside home plate, and the umpire looks over the catcher from behind home plate. Major league baseball defines the official strike zone, which are rendered on each image, as the three-dimensional region over home plate between the bottom of the batter's kneecaps and the midline of his chest.
Umpires have not always adhered closely to the official strike zone. As recently as the 1990s, pitches far beyond the side of home plate-that hitters would have to lunge for-were often called strikes, while high strikes-over the plate and between the hitter's belt and the midline of his chest-were almost always called balls. Major League Baseball could not remedy the problem by rewarding the least egregious violators, because the umpires union mandated that umpires evenly split postseason assignments and the accompanying bonuses (Callahan, 1998) .
In 1999, MLB initiated three small measures aimed at reducing discrepancies between enforced strike zones and the official strike zone: first, reminding all umpires of the definition of the official strike zone; second, instructing team officials to monitor each umpire's enforced strike zone; and third, suspending an umpire who physically confronted a player-the first suspension ever given to an umpire. A clumsy response by the umpires union paved the way for baseball to strengthen the formal incentives faced by umpires. First, the union authorized a strike. Then, upon realizing that its contract with MLB forbade a strike, the union tried to dissolve itself-convincing 57 of the 66 union umpires to resign-so as to negotiate a new contract. When a federal court ruled the dissolution null and void, Major League Baseball accepted the resignations of 22 umpires and hired 30 new umpires (Callan, 2012) . In an instant, MLB reconstituted its pool of about 70 full-time umpires (O'Connell, 2007) . To become a full-time umpire today, a candidate must graduate in the top fifth of his class from umpire school, rise through four levels of the minor leagues, be chosen to fill in for an umpire on vacation, and then be chosen to replace a retiring umpire (Caple, 2011) .
Home plate umpires in Major League Baseball now operate under a high degree of monitoring and performance-based incentives. MLB uses pitch-tracking technology to evaluate the calls of home plate umpires. In the early 2000s, MLB installed the QuesTec system in half of its stadiums. Mills (2015) shows that these cameras increased umpires' adherence to the official strike zone. Prior to the 2008 season, MLB installed the more accurate PITCH f/x system in every park. After each game, the home-plate umpire receives a breakdown of his performance, including a score that measures the accuracy of his calls. Umpires are evaluated twice each season, with evaluations based on reports from league-employed observers and analysis of the camera data. MLB rewards good performance with lucrative assignments to officiate the All-Star Game and the playoffs (Drellich, 2012) .
We measure umpires' adherence to their directive using pitch location data from the PITCH f/x cameras. Stereoscopic cameras record the trajectory of each pitch at over a dozen points. An algorithm then fits the observed coordinates to a parabola and infers the 2-dimension location where the pitch intersects the plane that rises from the front of home plate. MLB reports 4 measures of each pitch: that 2-dimensional location, the speed, the lateral movement, and the maximal vertical deviation from the straight-line path. MLB also labels each pitch with the categorical pitch type (e.g., four-seam fastball) from the pitcher's known repertoire that is best predicted by the observed speed and movement.
A pitch should be called a strike if its trajectory intersects the extruded pentagonal prism of the official strike zone. Since MLB does not report the full trajectory of each pitch, we instead compare the location of the pitch on the plane that rises from the front of home plate to the rectangular slice of the official strike zone defined on that plane. The validity of this comparison depends on two assumptions: first, that the parabolic fit correctly infers the true location of the pitch on that plane, and second, that this location fully captures the pitch's trajectory through the space defined by the official strike zone. We make these assumptions credible by restricting our sample to four-seam fastballs, which more than any other pitch type follow a straight-line path from the pitcher's hand to the catcher's glove.
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This restriction allows us to disregard the handedness of the pitcher and the skill of the catcher at framing pitches, both of which affect ball and strike calls significantly for offspeed pitches but only minimally for fastballs (Deshpande and Wyner, 2017) .
One issue remains when comparing 2-dimensional pitch locations to the official strike zone. Whereas the horizontal dimension of the official strike zone is fixed to the width of home plate, the vertical dimension of the official strike zone is determined by the batter's stance prior to the pitch. Hence, the absolute location of the pitch does not alone determine whether a pitch is a ball or a strike. To address this issue, a human operator using a separate camera (in center field) records the top and bottom boundaries of the official strike zone from the batter's stance prior to each pitch. Using these measures, we normalize the vertical location by fixing the vertical height of the official strike zone to its average height.
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A key explanatory variable in our analysis is the count, which tracks the number of balls and strikes in the at-bat, or the sequence of pitches between a pitcher and a batter. At the beginning of an at-bat, the count has 0 balls and 0 strikes. When the batter does not swing and the umpire calls a ball, the number of balls increases by one. When the batter swings, or when he doesn't and the umpire calls a strike, the number of strikes increases by one. 5 On average, the maximal vertical deviation between a four-seam fastball's trajectory and a straight-line path is 4.2 inches, compared to 7.9 inches for all other pitch types (t = 1.8 × 10
3 ). 6 Specifically, we redefine the vertical location of each pitch in relation to the midline of the top and bottom boundaries for that pitch and then multiply this redefined location by the ratio of the average height of the official strike zone to the height for the current pitch. For example, a pitch observed 40 inches above the ground with top and bottom boundaries 47 and 21 inches above the ground, respectively will first be redefined as having crossed 6 inches above the midline. Given that the average height of the official strike zone is 22 inches, our normalization places the pitch 5.5 inches above the midline.
7 The at-bat ends when the batter hits the ball in the field of play. If the batter hits the ball outside the field of play (a "foul ball"), the number of strikes in the count increases by one, and the at-bat continues. An exception is when the count has two strikes, in which case the count remains at two strikes. An exception to that exception is a bunt foul, which results in a strikeout when the count previously had two strikes.
Four balls end the at-bat with a walk, which favors the batting team; three strikes end the at-bat with a strikeout, which favors the pitching team. Counts are denoted balls before strikes. For instance, a 2-1 count means that the count has two balls and one strike.
Count
Pitches (%) P (¬swing) Calls (%) P (strike) 
Stylized Facts
Umpires deviate from the official strike zone by enforcing a strike zone that varies with the count. In this section, we visualize these changes, showing that they are universal, an order of magnitude larger than other systematic deviations among umpires, and inconsistent with previous interpretations.
3.1 Changes in the enforced strike zone with the count Figure 2 : Probability of a strike call when the batter chooses not to swing, for listed counts. Note: we estimate called strike probabilities in each count via kernel regression with a bivariate Gaussian kernel and Silverman's rule-of-thumb bandwidth in each dimension. For the difference plot (b), we use the larger of the two bandwidths in each dimension. Figure 2 shows the plane that rises from the front of home plate. The umpire looks through this plane over the catcher and towards the pitcher. A right-handed batter stands on the left, and a left-handed batter stands on the right. The dotted box bounds the official strike zone-the width of home plate on the horizontal axis, and the average distance between the bottom of the batter's kneecaps and the midline of his chest on the vertical axis. The contour lines in Figure 2a denote the rates at which umpires call strikes when the batter chooses not to swing; here, we restrict to the first pitch of the at-bat, when the count has 0 balls and 0 strikes; we estimate these probabilities via kernel regression with a bivariate Gaussian kernel and Silverman's rule-of-thumb bandwidth in each dimension.
9 Umpires reliably make obvious calls. Pitches that intersect the center of the official strike zone are almost always called strikes, and pitches that intersect the plane far outside the official strike zone are almost always called balls. But in between, pitches at the same location are sometimes called strikes and sometimes called balls. A band 6 to 8 inches wide separates locations where strikes are called 90% of the time from locations where strikes are called just 10% of the time.
For pitches in this band, the probability of a strike call varies with factors other than pitch location-in particular, the count. Figure 2b shows differences in the probability of a strike call between the two counts for which the differences are greatest-counts with 3 balls and 0 strikes and counts with 0 balls and 2 strikes.
10 Holding pitch location fixed, a strike call is more likely in a 3-0 count than in an 0-2 count at nearly every location. The difference peaks near the boundary of the official strike zone and particularly at the top, where pitches are as much as 60 percentage points more likely when the count favors the batter as when it favors the pitcher. Note: we estimate the enforced strike zone in each count using a support vector machine with a Gaussian kernel.
Umpires enforce different strike zones in different counts. Figure 3 shows the enforced strike zone, or the boundary that best separates ball and strike calls, for three different counts; we estimate each enforced strike zone using a support vector machine with a Gaussian kernel (cf. Friedman, Hastie and Tibshirani, 2001) . In each of these counts, as in every other, the enforced strike zone is wider than the official strike zone. It is also asymmetric on the horizontal axis, wider to the left of home plate than to the right, owing to different enforced strike zones for left-and right-handed batters, as shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix.
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Across counts, the size of the enforced strike zone varies. The enforced strike zone is 357 square inches in 0-2 counts and 565 square inches in 3-0 counts, an expansion of 58%.
The count-based deviations in the enforced strike zone appear to be universal. We reestimate the enforced strike zone in Figure 3 for each of the 60 umpires who make at least 10,000 calls on four-seam fastballs.
12 Every one of these umpires enforces a smaller strike zone in 0-2 counts than in 3-0 counts. Among them, the smallest difference in area between the enforced strike zone in these counts is 141 square inches, the maximum difference is 356 square inches, and the median difference is 218 square inches. These changes are not limited to the most imbalanced counts. We estimate the probability of a strike call in each count using a linear probability model with fixed effects by location and count:
where y i is an indicator for a strike call, x i is the location of the pitch, z indexes square-inch regions on the plane that rises from home plate, b and s index the number of balls and strikes in the count, and i is a mean-zero error term. Given that the deviations are greatest where the correct call is uncertain, we restrict the sample to the 323,560 calls for which the pitch is within 3 inches-about the diameter of a baseball-of the boundary of the official strike zone. We hold out β 0,0 , implying thatβ b,s represents the change in the probability of a strike call from a 0-0 count in a count with b balls and s strikes, for a fixed pitch location and for locations close to the boundary of the official strike zone. Figure 4 shows estimates of β b,s with 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered by umpire. The probability of a strike differs across counts. In 3-0 counts, a strike is 7.0 percentage points more likely on average than in 0-0 counts. In 0-2 counts, a strike is 14.3 percentage points less likely on average than in 0-0 counts. The probability of a strike also differs significantly from 0-0 counts in less imbalanced counts. In 2-0 counts, for instance, a strike is 4.3 percentage points more likely on average than in 0-0 counts, and in 0-1 counts, a strike is on average 9.7 percentage points less likely. Adding a strike to the count always decreases the probability of a strike call, and adding a ball to the count always increases the probability of a strike call. These estimates strongly reject the null hypothesis that calls do not depend on the count, or that the β b,s terms are equivalent; F(11,117) = 210.63, p < 10 −3 .
The deviations appear to be independent of Major League experience. We reestimate Equation 1 with an additional set of count fixed effects, and we interact this set with an indicator for whether the umpire is one of the 60 who makes at least 10,000 calls on fastballs over our observation window. These parameters measure count-by-count differences in the probability of a strike call between experienced and inexperienced umpires. An F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that each of these 12 parameters is zero; F(12,117) = 0.93, p = 0.52. Even the least experienced Major League umpires have been professional umpires for a decade or more. Perhaps as a result, Major League experience does not appear to influence the degree to which umpires change the enforced strike zone with the count. Table 2 : Estimates of the linear probability model in Equation 1 with covariates. Parameter estimates represent the change in the probability of a strike call for locations close to the boundary of the official strike zone, holding fixed the location of the pitch and the count. The sample is restricted to the 323,560 calls for which the pitch intersected the plane that rises from the front of home plate within 3 inches of the official strike zone. The dependent variable is an indicator for a strike call, and all models include fixed effects for 1) the squareinch location of the pitch, and 2) the count. F-test: β b,s reports an F-statistic for equivalence among the count fixed effects β b,s . Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by umpire.
Comparison with other deviations
Changes in the called-strike rates with the count are an order of magnitude larger than other deviations among umpires. Chen et al. (2016) find that umpires make negatively correlated judgments: the probability of a strike call declines when the previous pitch was called a strike. Other work has shown that soccer referees favor the home team (Sutter and Kocher, 2004; Garicano, Palacios-Huerta and Prendergast, 2005) . We estimate Equation 1 with covariates that measure these biases. Table 2 lists the corresponding parameter estimates as well as an F-statistic for equivalence among the β b,s terms. Model 1 tests for negative autocorrelation by including an indicator for whether the last pitch in the at-bat was called a strike.
13 The probability of a strike call decreases by 1.9 percentage points when the last pitch in the at-bat was called a strike (|t| = 5.68), consistent with negative autocorrelation in calls. Model 2 tests for home-team bias by including an indicator for whether the home team is batting. The probability of a strike call decreases by 0.46 percentage points when the home team is batting (|t| = 2.69), consistent with favoritism of the home team. In comparison, a strike is 21.2 percentage points more likely in a 3-0 count than in an 0-2 count (|t| = 38.56). The Appendix visualizes these results. Figure A2 shows the enforced strike zone for calls for which the previous pitch in the at-bat was called a strike and for called which the previous pitch in the at-bat was not called a strike, for each count with at least one strike. In each count, enforced strike zone depends minimally, if at all, on whether the previous pitch in the at-bat was called a strike. Figure A3 shows the difference in the probability of a strike call between calls when the home team is pitching and when the away team is pitching. The contour lines trace a flat plane at zero, suggesting minimal, if any, distortion.
Alternative interpretation
Changes in the enforced strike zone with the count have been interpreted as form of status quo bias (cf. Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) in which umpires are averse to game-changing calls-i.e., to a fourth ball or a third strike, both of which end the at-bat (Moskowitz and Wertheim, 2011; Mills, 2014; Green and Daniels, 2015) . This interpretation is inconsistent with two patterns in the data. First, an aversion to game-changing calls predicts that umpires will avoid calling balls principally when the count has 3 balls, and that they will avoid calling strikes principally when the count has 2 strikes. But as Figure 4 shows, the probability of a strike call varies smoothly with the number of balls and strikes in the count.
Second, a bias towards the status quo predicts that non-count factors which amplify the impact of one call-such as men on base, number of outs, or the score differential-will amplify the umpire's preference for the other call. However, we find that the enforced strike zone does not meaningfully depend on any of these factors. Model 3 of Table 2 includes covariates that proxy for asymmetries in game impact. We include an indicator for a count with 3 balls and a runner on first base; presumably, a walk is more beneficial to the batting team when it would move a runner into scoring position. We also include an indicator for a count with 2 strikes and 2 outs in the inning; presumably, a strikeout is more beneficial to the pitching team when it ends the inning. Finally, we include indicators for whether the pitching team is ahead and whether the batting team is ahead; presumably, an umpire who prefers evenness would favor the team that is behind. None of these variables meaningfully predicts the call, and their inclusion does not diminish the significance of the count indicators.
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Theoretical Framework
We show that a simple Bayesian model can account for the observed changes in the enforced strike zone with the count. After writing down the model, we illustrate its dynamics through examples and compare its predictions under different types of prior beliefs.
Bayesian model
We consider an umpire who holds prior beliefs about where the pitch is likely to be thrown, conditional on the batter choosing not to swing. The umpire also conditions his prior beliefs on the game state S-e.g., the count-as different states may imply different beliefs about pitcher and batter behavior. These prior beliefs represent the umpire's best guess about where the pitch will be thrown, prior to observing the pitch itself. We denote the umpire's prior beliefs as P (x 0 |S, ¬swing), where x 0 is the true location of the pitch.
When the pitch is thrown, the umpire observes a noisy signal of its true location. In particular, he observes the location x u , which is drawn from a distribution, F xu|x 0 , centered at the true location and known to the umpire. Hence, the umpire expects to observe the pitch at its true location, but acknowledging the difficulty of observing the exact location at which a fastball intersects the plane that rises from the front of home plate, he places 14 In a previous working paper, we interpreted the count-based distortions as an aversion to making the more pivotal call (Green and Daniels, 2015) . We provided two pieces of evidence in support of this interpretation. First, we showed that holding the count fixed, the call depends on other factors that make one call more pivotal than the other, which we termed the differential impact. Second, we showed that this dependence becomes more extreme in high-visibility games, namely during national weekend telecasts. For both analyses, we calculated the differential impact in the following manner. First, we used the count, number of outs, and indicators for men on base to estimate the number of runs that a team in that situation could expect to score over the remainder of the half inning. Second, we calculated the differential impact of a strike as the change in the expected number of runs from calling a strike minus the change in the expected number of runs from calling a ball. We then estimated the bias, defined as the change in the probability of a called strike from game states with a differential impact of 0, as a smooth function of the differential impact (holding constant the location of the pitch). For both analyses, our specification forced the estimate through the origin, thereby requiring that for pitches in which a ball and a strike were assessed to be similarly (non-)pivotal, umpires would call strikes at the same rate. Specifications that relax this restriction show no dependence on factors other than the count, nor do they show any differences between national weekend telecasts and other games. positive probability on nearby locations. The signal is simply f xu|x 0 , which we denote as P (x u |x 0 ). Note that this signal depends only on the umpire's eyesight, which we assume to be independent of the game state and whether or not the batter swings.
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Given prior beliefs and the signal, posterior beliefs follow from Bayes' rule:
The umpire's prior beliefs about where the pitch will be thrown shift his posterior beliefs about where the pitch was thrown towards locations that are a priori more expected in the current state. After integrating his prior beliefs with the signal, the umpire compares his posterior beliefs to a fixed rectangle, which we denote Z. He then makes the call that is more likely to be correct according to his posterior beliefs. If the majority of the posterior density lies inside Z, he calls a strike; if the majority of the posterior density lies outside Z, he calls a ball. Let θ S (x u ) equal 1 if the umpire calls a strike, and 0 otherwise. Then,
This Bayesian decision rule is deterministic. An observation x u and a state S jointly determine the umpire's posterior beliefs and, along with the boundaries of Z, the call he makes. Whereas this decision rule makes a binary prediction for x u , it makes a probabilistic prediction for x 0 . This probability is simply the expected call, with the expectation taken over the distribution of the umpire's observation:
The probability of a strike call for a pitch at x 0 is the share of draws x u for which a majority of the umpire's posterior beliefs are bounded by Z. This probabilistic prediction defines the predicted strike zone, or the set of true locations at which the umpire calls strikes more often than balls. Let y S (x 0 ) equal 1 if a pitch at x 0 is called a strike in expectation, and 0 otherwise. Hence,
15 Assuming independence between the likelihood and the batter's swing decision is innocuous as the umpire only makes a call when the batter chooses not to swing.
The model predicts that a pitch observed by the cameras at x 0 will be called a strike on average if for the majority of the nature's draws of x u , the majority of the umpire's posterior beliefs are bounded by Z.
Examples
Prior beliefs that coincide with rational expectations over the location of the pitch can explain changes in the enforced strike zone with the count. When the count favors the batter, the pitcher needs to throw a strike, and the batter can afford not to swing. Hence, umpires expect to make calls on pitches inside the official strike zone, and they shift their posterior beliefs towards the official strike zone. When the count favors the pitcher, the pitcher can afford to throw a ball, and the batter cannot risk letting a close pitch go by. Hence, umpires expects to make calls on pitches outside the official strike zone, and they shift their posterior beliefs about the true location of the pitch away from the official strike zone.
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Figure 5 illustrates these patterns. The first column shows the empirical distribution of pitch locations. Overall (5a), pitches concentrate at the center of the plane, with 42% thrown in the official strike zone. In 3-0 counts (5d), pitchers need to throw a strike. As a result, the distribution concentrates at the center, with 51% of pitches thrown in the official strike zone. In 0-2 counts (5g), pitchers need not throw a strike. As a result, the distribution is flatter, with only 24% of pitches thrown in the official strike zone.
The second column shows count-specific rates at which batters choose not to swing. Overall (5b), batters discriminate by location, swinging at pitches at the center of the plane, and taking pitches on the periphery. In 3-0 counts (5e), batters have the luxury of not swinging at a strike. As a result, they rarely swing, regardless of the location of the pitch. In 0-2 counts (5h), batters cannot afford a called third strike. As a result, they swing at most pitches near the official strike zone and rarely choose not to swing at a pitch that is clearly inside of it.
These tendencies underlie vastly different distributions of pitch locations for calls, which constitute the umpire's rational expectations about where the pitch will be thrown, conditional on the batter choosing not to swing. These expectations are shown in the third column. Overall (5c), umpires disproportionately make calls on the left and right edges of the official strike zone, with 25% of called pitches intersecting the official strike zone. In Figure 5 : Pitch density, rate of non-swings, and pitch density conditional on not swinging, overall (a-c) and in 3-0 (d-f) and 0-2 (g-i) counts. 3-0 counts (5f), umpires disproportionately make calls on pitches near the side and bottom boundaries of the official strike zone, and 49% of called pitches intersect the official strike zone. And in 0-2 counts (5i), umpires disproportionately make calls on pitches above and left and right of the official strike zone, with just 6% of called pitches intersecting the official strike zone. Given a prior and a signal, a Bayesian actor forms a posterior and makes a decision. In our framework, the prior coincides with the umpire's rational expectations and can be estimated from the data, as in Figure 5 . The signal, however, is unobserved to the analyst. So far, we have placed minimal structure on the signal, assuming only that the umpire's observation is unbiased. Here, we further assume that the signal is drawn from a bivariate normal distribution centered at the true location and with zero covariance-i.e., x u ∼ N x 0 , To see how the different prior expectations affect the umpire's posterior beliefs, consider a pitch observed to pass through the top-right corner of the official strike zone. The contour lines in Figure 6a show the posterior beliefs held by an umpire with a flat prior-i.e., who expects all locations to be equally likely. Here, we assume that Z coincides with the official strike zone, which is depicted on the figure by a dotted box. The observed location in Figure 6a is borderline: given a flat prior, about half of the posterior density lies inside the official strike zone. Borderline observations intersect the decision boundary, which is traced by the black curve. Under a flat prior, the decision boundary coincides with the official strike zone along its edges but has rounded corners, implying that pitches observed in the corners of the official strike zone will be called balls. For observations along the edges, half of the posterior density lies in official strike zone. But for observations on the corners, only one-quarter of the posterior density lies in the official strike zone.
The umpire's posterior beliefs, and thus the decision boundary, change with his prior beliefs. Figure 6b shows the umpire's posterior beliefs under the unconditional rationalexpectations prior shown in Figure 5c . Near the observed location, the gradient of the umpire's prior beliefs is flat-on average, locations around the top-right corner of the official strike zone are similarly likely. As a result, the umpire's posterior beliefs under this prior replicate his beliefs under the flat prior for an observation at this location. Figure 6c shows the umpire's posterior beliefs in a 3-0 count under the count-specific rational-expectations prior shown in Figure 5f . Near the observed location, points closer to the center are more expected than those farther away-in 3-0 counts, locations inside the official strike zone are more likely than locations outside-shifting the umpire's posterior beliefs inward. A majority of the posterior density now lies inside the official strike zone, and the umpire calls a strike as a result. The decision boundary expands outward to encompass the observed location. Figure 6d shows the umpire's posterior beliefs in a 0-2 count under the count-specific rational-expectations prior shown in Figure 5i . Near the observed location, points away from the center are more expected than those towards the center-in 0-2 counts, locations outside the official strike zone are more likely than locations inside-shifting the umpire's posterior beliefs outward. A majority of the posterior density now lies outside the official strike zone, and the umpire calls a ball as a result. The decision boundary shrinks inward, excluding the observed location.
In both counts, the umpire observes the pitch at the same location, but he makes opposite calls. When the count favors the batter, he calls a larger strike zone, and when the count favors the pitcher, he calls a smaller strike zone.
Accuracy
For the umpire with imperfect eyesight, incorporating count-specific expectations over the location of the pitch improves the accuracy of his calls. The intuition becomes apparent in the extreme: a blind umpire would guess correctly more often if he assumes that the pitch is drawn from the true empirical distribution. This logic also applies when the umpire's vision is imperfect: the umpire will make the correct call more often if he shifts his beliefs towards locations that are more likely.
Let the error rate at location x 0 in state S be the absolute difference between an indicator for whether x 0 is in the official strike zone and the predicted probability of a strike in state S from Equation 4, defining the states as the 12 counts. If at a location inside the official strike zone, the umpire calls a strike with probability 70%, then the error rate at that location is 30%.
To compute the predicted strike probability at a given location, we first discretize the plane that rises from home plate into a grid of one-inch squares bounded at 18 inches from the midline on both dimensions. In each square, we predict the probability of a strike by independently drawing N sim = 1000 observed locations, which we denotex u , from F xu|x 0 . As in the previous section, we assume that F xu|x 0 follows a bivariate normal distribution with variance terms σ 2 1 and σ 2 2 and no covariance. For each simulated observation, we integrate the signal with the prior according to Bayes rule, and sum the posterior density over the official strike zone. If at least half of the posterior density is inside the official strike zone, then θ S (x u,i ; σ The probability of a strike is the average call over the 1000 simulations:
And the error rate is the absolute difference between that probability and an indicator for whether the true location is in the official strike zone:
We then compute average error rate, λ, weighting by P (x 0 , S), the joint probability of observing a call at x 0 in count S:
For a given pair of variance terms, we perform this computation once for each the three types of prior beliefs from the previous section. Figure 7a shows the error rate under the flat prior, for a range of variance terms. For near-zero values of σ 1 and σ 2 , the umpire has near-perfect eyesight, and he is near-certain that the observed location is the true location. Given a degenerate and accurate signal, the prior is irrelevant, and the error rate is zero under either prior. As the variance grows, the umpire's observations are drawn from a wider distribution-i.e., his eyesight worsens-and the error rate increases. Rational expectations alone do not improve error rates. Figure 7b shows the percent improvement in the error rate under the unconditional rational-expectations prior, relative to the flat prior. For reasonable values of the variance terms-i.e., in which the umpire's eyesight is not profoundly worse in one direction that the other-error rates are comparable under the two priors. Umpires experience minimal, if any, benefits from shifting their beliefs towards locations that are more expected on average.
The Bayesian umpire lowers his error rate not by holding unconditional rational expectations, but by conditioning those expectations on the count. Figure 7c shows the percent improvement under the count-specific prior, relative to the unconditional rational-expectations prior. Except for umpires with near-perfect vision, umpires benefit from shifting their beliefs towards locations that, given the count, are more expected. At σ 1 = σ 2 = 3 inches, for instance, λ S is about 2% lower than λ RE .
This improvement is greatest in counts for which the count-specific empirical distribution of called pitches is most different from the overall distribution. For σ 1 = σ 2 = 3 inches, λ S is 11% lower than λ RE in 0-2 counts, 9% lower in 1-2 counts, 7% lower in 3-2 and 2-2 counts, and 5% lower in 3-0 counts. The distribution of called pitches varies considerably between counts, as Figures 5f and 5i show. Approximating these distributions by taking their average, as in Figure 5c , ignores this variation and worsens performance.
Model estimates
Does a Bayesian umpire reproduce the observed changes in the enforced strike zone with the count, as depicted in Section 3? We calibrate the model and show that under the count-specific rational-expectations prior, it predicts these changes almost exactly.
Estimation steps
Assuming, as before, that the umpire's observation is drawn from a normal distribution with zero covariance, our model is characterized by six parameters: the variance terms, σ 2 1 and σ 2 2 , as well as the four boundaries of Z. Previously, we chose the variance terms arbitrarily or estimated the model for a range of values, and we assumed that the boundaries coincide with the official strike zone. Here, we find the parameters that best predict observed calls.
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Specifically, we use non-linear least squares to find the parameter values that minimize the average area between the count-specific enforced and predicted strike zones, weighted by the number of observed calls in each count: arg min
Here,ŷ S (x 0 ) defines the enforced strike zone in count S, equaling 1 when a pitch at the true location x 0 is more often called a strike than a ball in the data, and 0 otherwise. As in Equation 5, y S (x 0 ; σ 2 1 , σ 2 2 , Z) is the predicted strike zone in count S, equaling 1 when a pitch at the true location x 0 is called a strike in expectation by our Bayesian umpire, and 0 otherwise. As before, we discretize the plane into a square-inch grid bounded at 18 inches from the midlines.
We estimate the enforced strike zone using a support vector machine with a Gaussian kernel, as in Figure 3 . The SVM separates locations at which strikes are called a majority of the time from locations at which balls are called a majority of the time. The solid boundaries in Figure 10 below show the enforced strike zone in each count. We estimate the predicted strike zone as in the previous section. For each true location, we calculate the probability of a strike call from 1000 simulated calls under the current parameter estimates, as in Equation 6, classifying the location as inside the predicted strike zone if the probability of a strike call at that location is at least 0.5.
The objective function in Equation 7 counts discrepancies between the enforced and predicted strike zones across the grid. We take a weighted average over the counts, weighting each count by N S , the number of calls observed in that count. Thus, the value of the objective function is the average area, in square inches, over which the enforced and predicted strike zones disagree. We find the parameters that minimize Equation 7 using a genetic algorithm. 
Estimates
We estimate the model separately for the three types of prior beliefs discussed previously: a flat prior in which all locations are on the grid are viewed as equally likely, regardless of the count; a rational-expectations prior, measured as the empirical density of called pitches, as shown in Figure 5c ; and a count-specific rational-expectations prior, measured as the count-specific empirical density of called pitches and rendered in Figure 8 .
19
Estimates of the boundaries are nearly identical under each prior. The top and bottom boundaries coincide with those of the official strike zone (under the flat prior, the bottom boundary is an inch lower). However, the sides are wider than the official strike zone, and this deviation is asymmetric. Whereas the right edge is about 2 inches wider than the official strike zone, the left edge is about 4 inches wider, consistent with the estimates in Figures 2 and 3. The asymmetry can be attributed to differences in the enforced strike zone for leftand right-handed batters, as we discuss in Footnote 11.
18 Genetic algorithms address two difficulties in minimizing the objective function in Equation 7. First, the objective function is composed of indicator functions, precluding the use of derivative-based algorithms. Genetic algorithms evaluate the function, not its derivatives. Second, the objective function may have many local minima, and they may be far apart in the parameter space. Though genetic algorithms offer no guarantee of finding the global minimum, they are designed to search efficiently over a multidimensional space. We constrain the search by bounding σ 2 1 and σ 2 2 to each be less than 6 inches and by restricting the four boundaries of Z to integers between 7 and 15 inches from the midline on each dimension (inclusive), given that the discrete grid has a coarseness of 1 inch. The algorithm generates 60 candidate parameter vectors in each population and stops only when the objective function value associated with the best vector is unchanged for 15 successive generations. 19 We estimate the density in each count using a bivariate Gaussian kernel with Silverman's rule-of-thumb bandwidth along each dimension. Counts with more observations have lower bandwidths. This imbues the umpire's beliefs with a precision that increases with his past exposure. Along the horizontal dimension, the bandwidth varies from 0.88 inches in 0-0 counts to 1.81 inches in 3-2 counts. Along the vertical dimension, the bandwidth varies from 0.86 inches in 0-0 counts to 1.91 inches in 3-2 counts. For each of the priors, the variance terms are identified by different aspects of the data. For the flat prior, increasing the variance rounds the corners of the predicted strike zone. Hence, the parameters are identified by the average roundness of the enforced strike zone, which is not very informative. Figure 9a shows the objective function under the flat prior in terms ofσ 1 andσ 2 , with the boundaries fixed at their estimated values. The minimum is not well identified, as values of the function are similar for a wide range of parameter estimates.
For either of the informative priors, increasing the variance makes the predicted strike zone more responsive to the prior. Hence, the variance terms are identified by whether the prior shapes the predicted strike zone to match the empirical strike zone. Figure 9b shows the objective function under the unconditional rational-expectations prior. The minimum is better identified than under the flat prior, as the function converges to a smaller basin. Figure 9c shows the objective function under the count-specific rational-expectations prior. The minimum is well identified, as the function converges sharply to a narrow basin.
The optimal variance terms under this prior appear reasonable. Our estimates ofσ 1 = 3.1 inches andσ 2 = 4.1 inches imply that 15%, 46%, and 75% of observations are within 2, 4, and 6 inches of their true location. These estimates are precise, with standard errors of 0.14 inches forσ 1 and 0.12 inches forσ 2 .
20 The larger estimate on the vertical dimension indicates that the predicted strike zone expands and contracts more vertically than horizontally, as is true of the enforced strike zone. This asymmetry may also reflect the difficulty of observing the location of the pitch in relation to the midline of the batter's chest or the bottom of the kneecaps. By comparison, the umpire can more easily tell whether the pitch passes over home plate, which provides a white backdrop for the pitch from the umpire's vantage point. Our Bayesian model fits the data closely when the umpire is imbued with count-specific rational expectations. The minimum objective function value, or the area over which the enforced and predicted strike zones disagree, is 27.4 square inches under the count-specific prior-an area equivalent to just 7% of the official strike zone. By contrast, the area of disagreement is 50.3 square inches under the unconditional rational-expectations prior and 51.2 square inches under the flat prior. Refining the umpire's prior beliefs does not provide additional degrees of freedom and thus does not necessarily improve the model's fit. For instance, prior beliefs that shift posterior beliefs towards the periphery when the count favors the batter would worsen the fit. Instead, the close fit that our model achieves under the countspecific rational expectations prior implies that a Bayesian model with this sophisticated prior fits the data remarkably well. Figure 10 visualizes the fit between the model and the data in each count. The dashed irregular ellipse bounds the predicted strike zone, y S (x 0 ), under count-specific rational expectations; the solid irregular ellipse bounds the enforced strike zone,ŷ S (x 0 ); and the dotted box denotes the estimated boundaries of Z. In each count, the predicted and enforced strike zones coincide, or nearly coincide. When the predicted strike zone is large, as when the count favors the batter, so too is the enforced strike zone. And when the predicted strike zone is small, as when the count favors the pitcher, so too is the enforced strike zone. The enforced strike zone even responds to asymmetries in how the predicted strike zone changes across counts. As the number of strikes increases, the contraction in both the predicted and enforced strike zones is concentrated at the top.
We also use the model to predict the probability of a strike call under the count-specific rational-expectations prior, as in Equation 6. Figure 11a shows the probability of a strike call across the plane when the count has 0 balls and 0 strikes-the theoretical analogue to the empirical estimate in Figure 2a . As is the case for actual umpires, the Bayesian umpire reliably makes obvious calls: pitches in the center of the official strike zone are almost always called strikes, and pitches on the periphery are almost always called balls. However, (σ 1 ,σ 2 ). We then use method of moments to fit those objective function values to a parabola of the form ax Vertical axis (in) Figure 11 : Predicted probability of a strike call, for listed counts. the region in which the umpire sometimes calls balls and sometimes calls strikes for pitches at the same location, is slightly wider in the prediction than in the empirical estimate. In the prediction, the region between the 10% and 90% contour lines is 8 to 10 inches wide, compared to a width of 6 to 8 inches in the empirical estimate. Reducing the variance of the signal improves the fit. In particular, variance terms of σ 2 1 = σ 2 2 = 3 2 inches yield a prediction that closely mimics the empirical estimate in Figure 2a . Of course, this comes at the expense of agreement between the predicted and empirical strike zones, as implied by the plot of the objective function in Figure 9c . Differences in the probability of a strike call between counts are reproduced in shape, though not in magnitude. Figure 11b shows the difference in the predicted probability of a strike call between 3-0 and 0-2 counts-the theoretical analogue to the empirical estimate in Figure 2b . As is true of actual umpires, the Bayesian umpire is more likely to call strikes in 3-0 counts than in 0-2 counts, particularly at the top of the official strike zone. However, the difference is only about half as large in the prediction as in the empirical estimate. For pitches at the top of the official strike zone, the predicted probability of a strike changes by more than 30 percentage points between the most imbalanced counts; in the data, the difference is more than 60 percentage points.
The parameters which minimize the distance between the predicted and enforced strike zones do not minimize the distance between predicted and empirical probabilities of a strike call. One reason may be that the signal does not follow a Gaussian distribution. Among symmetric distributions, there is no theoretical reason to prefer the Gaussian, and another distribution may yield a precise fit both when predicting balls and strikes in expectation and when predicting probabilities.
21 A second possibility is that the distribution of the signal varies with pitch characteristics. Fastballs are thrown faster in counts that favor the pitcher.
22 If the variance of the signal increases with pitch speed-i.e., if faster fastballs are harder to observe-then a Bayesian model would predict tighter contour lines in Figure 11a (since fastballs are relatively slow in 0-0 counts) and larger differences in Figure 11b (since fastballs are much slower in 3-0 counts than in 0-2 counts).
Blurred rational expectations
A Bayesian model in which umpires combine rational expectations with noisy observations predicts observed decisions well. To what degree does this performance depend on our estimates of the count-specific rational-expectations prior? In particular, would a model underpinned by less precise estimates predict observed decisions just as well? Here, we consider a model with blurred rational expectations, or over-smoothed versions of the kernel density estimates in Figure 8 . These prior beliefs preserve the gross features of the countspecific rational expectations without preserving the details. That is, they represent the prior beliefs of a Bayesian umpire whose rational expectations are constructed from a random subset of the million observations at our disposal. We refit the model under different degrees of blurred rational expectations. Specifically, we over-smooth the kernel density estimates in Figure 8 by multiplying Silverman's ruleof-thumb bandwidth in both dimensions by a given factor. Figure 12 shows the area of disagreement between the enforced and predicted strike zone for different bandwidth factors. A factor of 1 reproduces our estimates from the previous section, yielding 27.35 square inches of disagreement. A factor of 2-equivalent to reducing the number of observations by a factor of 2 5 = 32-fares marginally worse, yielding 28.10 square inches of disagreement, an increase of 3%. A bandwidth factor of 3-equivalent to reducing the number of observations by a factor of 3 5 = 243-fares considerably worse, yielding 31.30 square inches of disagreement, an increase of 14%.
We also estimate the model with a signal that follows a bivariate t distribution. The t distribution is a generalization of the normal. An extra parameter, the degrees of freedom, modulates the proportion of mass in the tails. We estimate a degrees of freedom parameter of 13, which effectively reduces the t-distribution to a normal.
22 This is likely a product of selection. Pitchers who throw harder reach pitcher-friendly counts more often.
23 The estimated bounds of Z do not change for bandwidth factors of 1.5 and 2; for factors of 2 and 2.5, the top boundary drops from 10 inches above the midline to 9 inches. Across the bandwidth factors,σ 1 Figure 12 : Area of disagreement (in square inches) between the enforced and predicted strike zones, for different degrees of over-smoothed prior beliefs. Note: we over-smooth the umpire's prior beliefs by reestimating the kernel density estimates in Figure 8 with excessive bandwidths, using Silverman's rule-of-thumb bandwidth in each dimension multiplied by the given bandwidth factor.
Over-smoothing the umpire's rational expectations worsens model fit. Hence, observed calls more closely correspond to a model in which the umpire holds precise rational expectations rather than a blurred set that over-smooths its features. However, the model performs only marginally worse when the umpire forms his rational expectations from an order-ofmagnitude fewer observations than are available to us, implying that the gross features of the empirical density of called pitches are sufficient, or almost sufficient, for predicting the enforced strike zone.
Weighting the signal
Umpires make calls as if applying a consistent decision rule to posterior beliefs formed from rational priors and imperfect signals. Do umpires combine the prior and signal optimally? The weight placed on the prior relative to the signal should reflect the quality of the umpire's eyesight: an umpire with perfect vision should place all the weight on the signal, and a blind umpire should place all the weight on the prior.
In our model, the variance of the signal represents the umpire's eyesight and determines the weight placed on the prior. A higher variance implies that the umpire is less likely to ranges from 2.6 to 3.2 inches, andσ 2 ranges from 3.7 to 4.2 inches.
observe the pitch near its true location. As such, he places more weight on the prior. Since we cannot measure eyesight directly, we instead estimate the variance terms by finding the values that best predict observed calls. The values we estimate appear reasonable, suggesting that updating by umpires approximates Bayes rule. However, our model assumes that umpires know the true distribution of the signal-i.e., umpires form posterior beliefs from the same distribution as their observations are drawn from. If umpires are overconfident about their eyesight and thereby underestimate the variance of the signal, they will underweight the prior. Likewise, if umpires are underconfident about their eyesight and thereby overestimate the variance of the signal, they will overweight the prior.
Here, we allow umpires to misperceive the distribution of the signal. Specifically, we simulate observed locations from one distribution, and we allow umpires to form beliefs from a signal with a different distribution. As before, we assume that both distributions are centered at the true location and have zero covariance. However, we now estimate four variance parameters, one in each dimension for each distribution.
Different elements of the data identify the parameters of each distribution. Increasing the variance of the distribution from which observations are drawn worsens the umpire's vision, which makes the predicted strike zone round; hence, these variance parameters are identified by the roundness of the enforced strike zone. The variance of the umpire's perception of the signal also modulates responsiveness to the prior; hence, these variance parameters are partially identified by the extent to which the prior can shape the predicted strike zone to match the enforced strike zone. We suggest caution in interpreting the estimates that follow. Both distributions determine the roundness of the predicted strike zone; hence, both sets of variance terms are identified by the roundness of the enforced strike zone. Moreover, roundness in the enforced strike zone is amplified by pooling umpires with even subtly different tendencies. Finally, no feature of the enforced strike zone provides a direct measure of the quality of umpires' eyesight.
Our results provide mixed evidence on optimal weighting. The model fit improvesthe area of disagreement shrinks from 27.4 square inches to 23.8 square inches-owing the extra parameters and to differences in the variance estimates between the distributions.
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We estimate that observations are drawn from a distribution with a standard deviation of 4.3 inches along the horizontal dimension and 4.2 inches along the vertical dimension. The symmetry of these estimates, which proxy for eyesight quality, suggest that vision is no better (or worse) in one direction. For the umpire's perception of the signal, we estimate a standard deviation of 2.1 inches along the horizontal dimension and 4.6 inches along the vertical dimension. These estimates confirm previous findings of greater responsiveness along the vertical dimension. They also suggest some misperception of the signal: umpires appear to underweight the prior along the horizontal dimension and approximate Bayes rule along the vertical dimension.
Discussion
Major League Baseball directs umpires to make ball and strike calls based solely on the location of the pitch. Yet umpires make different calls in different counts for pitches at the same location. Previous research has argued that umpires employ different decision rules in different counts (Moskowitz and Wertheim, 2011; Mills, 2014; Green and Daniels, 2015) . We show that these patterns can be rationalized by a simple Bayesian model in which umpires apply a consistent decision rule to beliefs that vary rationally across counts.
Though the model is straightforward, the behavior it predicts requires considerable sophistication. The umpire must instantaneously weigh his imperfect observation of the location of the pitch against count-specific rational expectations that differ by location. We find that decisions by professional umpires reflect a precise understanding of what they should rationally expect, as well as an ability to instantaneously integrate those prior beliefs in a manner that approximates Bayes rule.
Intuition and rationality
Departures from rational models of belief formation are typically attributed to heuristic rules and other intuitive processes that are unknowingly misapplied (Simon, 1982; Kahneman, 2011) . Judging probabilities from salient characteristics, for instance, may be advisable when determining whether an animal with sharp incisors is a predator. However, applying those same heuristics in new environments can lead to systematic errors. When asked whether a woman described as "deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice" is more likely to be 1) a bank teller, or 2) a bank teller and a feminist, more respondents choose the latter, even though feminist bank tellers are clearly a subset of bank tellers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) . When applied out of context, intuitions can be very bad.
When applied appropriately, however, intuitions should be capable of being very good. Psychologists have speculated that rational benchmarks are most achievable in contexts where outcomes are predictable and practice provides feedback (Kahneman and Klein, 2009 ).
However, tests of this proposition are rare, owing to the difficulty of measuring performance by experts in the field against predictions from classical models. Notable exceptions include evidence of minimax play by professional tennis players when choosing whether to serve outside or down the line (Walker and Wooders, 2001 ) and by professional soccer players when choose to kick a penalty left or right (Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose, 2002; PalaciosHuerta, 2003) . In both cases, the rational benchmark requires at best a moderate level of sophistication-choosing left or right at some fixed rate-and players face no time pressure.
Umpires achieve a far more sophisticated benchmark. Their split-second decisions approximate Bayesian updating from rational expectations that vary in a complex manner with both the location of the pitch and the count. Calling balls and strikes should be amenable to intuitive expertise: observable cues point to the correct call, which Major League umpires learn through decades of training and experience, as well as feedback on hundreds of decisions after each game. Nonetheless, their sophistication is remarkable. The psychologist Amos Tversky once remarked, "All your economic models are premised on people being smart and rational, and yet all the people you know are idiots."
25 Our results suggest that highly rational behavior can be learned intuitively, and hence, that feedback and repetition, rather than intelligence, can underpin rationality. 
Statistical discrimination
Our results can also be understood as evidence of statistical discrimination, or the use of disallowed information to make more correct decisions. Umpires face a tradeoff between procedural fairness and accuracy. MLB instructs umpires to make ball and strike calls based solely on the location of the pitch but evaluates umpires based on the accuracy of their calls. When the location of the pitch is unclear, discriminating along other variables that predict pitch location-i.e., the count-helps umpires make more correct calls. Umpires statistically discriminate: they make different calls in different counts for pitches at the same location, and they do so in a manner that improves their accuracy. Statistical discrimination is not unique to umpires. The same elements that make statistical discrimination appealing to umpires-incentives to make correct decisions and disallowed evidence that can help make more correct decisions on average-exist in many other important settings, from the courtroom to the classroom to the interview room to the immigration desk. Our setting is unique in that statistical discrimination among umpires is directly 25 Quoted in Lewis (2016) . 26 For a longer discussion on this point, and for additional evidence, see Green, Rao and Rothschild (2016). observable. In most settings, both the arbitrator and the analyst face uncertainty about whether the allowed evidence implies guilt or innocence. In baseball, only the umpire is uncertain whether a pitch is truly a ball or a strike-the analyst knows the truth.
To our knowledge, our results are the first to provide direct field evidence of statistical discrimination. Evidence of discrimination can rarely differentiate between statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination, in which the use of disallowed information provides direct utility irrespective of whether doing so improves accuracy (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) .
27 In cases where the mechanism can be parsed, taste-based discrimination has proven more readily identifiable, either by observing animus directly (e.g. Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014) or by observing patterns of discrimination that cannot plausibly be efficient, as with favoritism of same-race players by referees (Price and Wolfers, 2010; Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates and Hamermesh, 2011) . The few field studies that claim to identify statistical discrimination do so indirectly, either by testing auxiliary predictions (Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Ondrich, Ross and Yinger, 2003; Levitt, 2004; Ewens, Tomlin and Wang, 2014) or by conducting laboratory-style experiments in the field (List, 2004) . 28 In contrast, we estimate a simple model of statistical discrimination using the observed choices of professional arbitrators and direct estimates of rational expectations, and we find that this model almost entirely accounts for otherwise puzzling empirical patterns.
27 Others have proposed a second distinction: whether discrimination is intentional or implicit (Bertrand, Chugh and Mullainathan, 2005) . We do not take a stand on whether statistical discrimination by umpires is deliberate.
28 In a framed field experiment, List (2004) shows that professional sports-card traders quote higher prices to women and minorities than to white men. He finds that traders do not discriminate by race or gender when paired with potential customers in the dictator game, suggesting that the discrimination is not taste based. And he shows that these traders perform better than random guessing when asked to choose which of two unlabeled distributions of reservation values was elicited from white men rather than from women and minorities, suggesting that the discrimination is statistical in nature. 
